Alchian and Demsetz's (1972) classic paper models team production as a public good. They claim detection of individual effort levels, rather than aggregate effort levels, reduces shirking (free riding). This paper experimentally tests this claim. Participants are informed either about the individual contributions of others on their team or only about their team's total contribution. Average contributions in the two treatments are the same. However, contributions under individual feedback have a significantly higher variance than those under total feedback. Implications of these results for team production are discussed. 
Introduction
Alchian and Demsetz (1972) classic paper suggests modeling team production as a public goods problem. Each team member's effort bas a positive externality on the other team members. They claim that any costs of monitoring the effort expanded by an individual on a team will lead to shirking (free riding).
If a worker's "relaxation cannot be detected perfectly at zero cost, part of its effects will be borne by others in the team, thus making his realized cost of relaxation less than the true total cost to the team. The difficulty of detecting such actions permits the private costs of his actions to be less than their full costs . .. [which] implies a lower rate of productive effort and more shirking than in a costless monitoring, or measuring, world."
This vision of team production has been extensively developed and explored in the theoretical literature (Marshak and Radner ( 1972) , Holmstrom ( 1982) , Holmstrom and Tirole (1989) ).
This paper provides an experimental test of Alchian and Demsetz's original claims. A public goods problem is induced in the laboratory and the extent of shirking (free riding) is measured in both of two treatments. In the first, total-feedback treatment, participants have information only on the total amount contributed to the public good by the other members of their group. This is analogous to knowing the output or total effort of one's team (and one's own effort level) but not knowing how much effort each of the other players have contributed. Shirking thus cannot be detected, much less perfectly and at zero cost. In the second, individual-feedback treatment, participants are told at the end of each round how much each individual in their group contributed. This is analogous to knowing exactly how much effort each individual has contributed to the group product.
Thus shirking can be detected perfectly and at zero cost.'
The use of the voluntary contribution mechanism to elicit contributions to the public goods directly mirrors the voluntary nature of expended effort in an employment situation. Alchian and Demsetz write that "[The firm] . . . has no power of fiat, no authority , no disciplinary action any different in the slightest degree from ordinary market contracting between any two people." (p. 777) Workers voluntary choose the level of effort to expend, as in this mechanism participants voluntarily choose the level of contributions to make to the group account.
The experiment further captures the team production analogy in that the game is repeated, but only finitely many times. Like an employment situation, individuals interact repeatedly and also like an employment situation, the game comes to an end eventually.
The main result from this study is not consistent with Alchian and Demsetz's claim. Average contributions are not statistically different between the two feedback treatments. The variance of contributions in the individual-feedback treatment, however, is significantly higher than that in the total-feedback treatment. Implications of this result for team production are discussed in Section 5.
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This research is of some methodological interest as well. Experimental economists have studied the public goods problem and the voluntary provision of public goods extensively (for excellent summaries see Davis and Holt (1993), ch. 6 and Ledyard (1995) ). Although most previous public goods experiments have been run under the total-feedback condition, some (e.g., Chan, Godby, Mestelman and Muller (1993)) have been run under individual feedback. Understanding the difference between these two treatments can help us predict outcomes in these experiments and in their real-life counterparts more accurately.
Previous Research
Two previous papers have examined the impact of distributional information on contributions in public goods games. Sell and Wilson (1991) compared three experimental conditions: individual information, aggregate information and no information . In the no information condition, participants were told nothing about the previous round 's results until the entire (ten-round) game had ended. In the aggregate information treatment, participants were told the total group's investment at the end of each period. This corresponds to the total-feedback treatment in this study. In the individual information condition. participants were told the total number of tokens each individual member had contributed to the public good. This treatment is similar to the individual-feedback treatment in this study, with one exception. In Sell and Wilson, members of a participant's group were identified and their contributions recorded over time. Each participant could thus "trace" each other participant's contributions from period to period. In this study, the contributions were not associated with any particular contributor. A participant could thus not directly observe another participant's lowering or raising his contribution. 
Experimental Procedure and Design
This study used a voluntary contribution mechanism to elicit public goods provision. For each treatment, 24 participants (in two groups of 12) were recruited from economics classes in the University of Arizona summer session. Participants were randomly assigned to groups of four, remaining in the same group for the entire experiment. In each round they were endowed with 25 tokens, which could be placed either into a private account or into a group account but could not be saved for use in future rounds. Tokens are thus analogous to time which can be spent on leisure or on expanding effort. In a similar way hours cannot be saved for use the next day. Subjects were compensated in dollars for tokens (time) spent in a private account (on leisure) and in a public account (on effort). The experiments lasted a finite number of rounds.
The conditions under which this procedure will induce a public goods problem are simple to illustrate. Assume each player i in a group of N identical players has some endowment E, which can either be c. ontributed to a group account and used to produce units of a public good (analogous to expending effort) or can be privately consumed and converted to cash (analogous to shirking or consuming leisure). Call the amount contributed to the group account by i, x,. The individual's earnings from private consumption (leisure) is simply the amount consumed (E,-x,). The individual's earnings from contributions to the group account is a function of the sum of contributions by all participants P(L;x,). The group's earnings is the sum of the individual earnings and the payouts from the group account L;(E,-x,) + NP(!:,x,). Each individual chooses x, to maximize his earnings ((E,-X;) + P~)). We say there is a (pure) public goods problem when two conditions are satisfied.
Condition 1: Contributions to the private account are individually optimal.
(1)
Thus regardless of the contributions of the other players, player i never wants to contribute to the group account This is analogous to assuming that an individual prefers to shirk than to work in the absence of any punishment Were this not the case there would be no need for any sort of monitoring-all individuals would work because they preferred to do so.
Condition 2: Contributions to the private account are not optimal for the group.
Regardless of the contributions of the other players the group as a whole earns more when player i contributes to the group account than when he contributes to the private account This is analogous to assuming that the team as a whole produces more than an individual's value ofleisure when an individual expands effort. Were this not the case it would be socially optimal for all workers to engage in leisure rather than in expanding effort
The payoff per token for the private account in this study was 2¢ to the private and for the group account was 1¢ to each member of the group. With a group size of 4 we can confmn that both conditions (1) and (2) above are satisfied. Condition (1) suggests that each individual prefers to contribute each marginal token to the private account (earning 2¢) than to the group account (earning I¢). Condition (2) suggests that the group as a whole is better off when each individual contributes his marginal token to the group account (which earns 4¢ for the group--!¢ for each of four members) than when he contributes his marginal token to the private account (which earns 2¢ only for him).
There were two games lasting ten rounds each. Participants were initially told they would play a game of ten rounds. At the end of the ten rounds, they were told (unexpectedly) that there was just enough time to restan the game and to play another ten rounds. This technique has been used previously to simulate a "new game" (Andreoni (1988)) or in this setting, a new task with the same team members. The first ten rounds (the first game) and the second ten rounds (the restart game) are reported separately.
This study was completely computerized. Participants signed in, collected their show-up fee and sat at a computer terminal. The instructions were given via the computer screen and participants typed their contribution decisions on the keyboard.
Participants played three practice rounds (for which they earned no money) to familiarize themselves with the setup of the computer.
6 Participants were paid a five dollar show-up fee plus their earnings in the experiment Each session lasted around an hour and participants earned on average $13.97 along with the show-up fee.
At the end of each round in the total-feedback treatment, participants saw their own earnings, the total number of tokens the other three members of their group had contributed to the public good and the group's total contribution. In the individualfeedback treatment, participants saw the individual contributions of the other three members of their group in increasing order of contribution, as well as their own earnings and the total contributed. In contrast to Sell and Wilson, here individual contributions
were not identified with their contributor. Weimann does not describe the level of identification available in his setting.
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When a game such as this one, which includes a pure public goods problem, is played once there is a unique dominant strategy equilibrium in which all players fully free ride (fully shirk). When the game is repeated finitely many times (with endowments expiring at the end of each period), contributing zero in all periods is the unique subgame perfect equilibrium. These strong equilibrium predictions are, however, not typically observed.
Experimental Results

A. Feedback Treatment
Of primary interest is the difference in contributions between the two feedback (monitoring) conditions. Overall, average contributions in the two treatments were statistically indistinguishable. 8 Over all periods in the first game there are no significant differences between treatments in average contributions. Over all periods in the restart game, contributions are significantly different between treatments at the 5% level. If we pool average contribution levels over both games, there is no statistical difference in contributing behavior between the two treatments. These results are described in Table 1 below.
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Insert Table 1 here Figure 1 shows the average participant contribution in each treatment over ten first rounds and ten restart rounds. The average contributions in each treatment are very close, except at the end of the second ten rounds where they diverge.
Insert Figure 1 here
Although there is no statistical difference in average contributions between the two treatments overall, the variances of these contributions differ greatly. There is significantly more variation in group contributions under the individual-feedback condition. 10 That the variances of contributions differ between treatments can be tested with an F-test. Table 2 reportS variances of average group contributions in each period.
Insert Table 2 here An F-test on contributions between treatments within each game and over both games combined, reports significantly more variation under individual feedback than under total feedback. The results of these F-tests are depicted in Table 3 .
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Insert Table 3 here These high variances under the individual-feedback condition seem to come from each group developing its own norm of contribution (or effort) level. Implications of a group effort-norm on team production will be discussed in section 5. Finally, we can look at the proportion of free riders (participants contributing zero tokens or shirking) and of full contributors (participants contributing all 25 tokens) in each treatment. Table 4 compares the incidence of free riding in the two treatments and Tables 4 and 5 here There is always at least as much free riding and full contributing in the individualfeedback treatment as in the total-feedback treatment. This result is consistent with the higher variance of contributions in the individual-feedback condition seen in Table 3 .
B. Learning
Of secondary interest is the amount of learning exhibited by participants in this experiment between the first and the restart games. If learning were found it may suggest that workers learn to shirk less (or more) as they engage in more team production.
However. behavior in the restart game was similar to that of the first under both conditions. In fact, the distribution of contributions in a given round was indistinguishable from the distribution of contributions in that same-numbered restarted round, with one exception. 13 A more powerful statistical test uses a blocking technique to distinguish between contributions in the first game (the first 10 rounds) and contributions in the restart game (the second 10 rounds). Here, the total-feedback treatment shows some evidence of decreasing contribution levels over the two games (more shirking), but there is no such evidence for the individual-feedback treatment. This high variance suggests there may be some (hidden) characteristics of teams which lead them either to shirking or cooperating. Without knowing in advance which team has which characteristics, a planner cannot know how an individual team will react to the additional information. More research is clearly needed to understand the development of these group norms which will enable us to estimate a team's reaction to a change in information.
These results have implications for experimental methodology as well.
Researchers often compare outcomes between experiments to draw general conclusions. The experiment reported in this paper uses a fixed compensation scheme and changes the level of information available to the participants. For an excellent evaluation of various incentive and compensation schemes with the same levels of information see Nalbantian and Schotter (1994).
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In Sell and Wilson's design, two factors were confounded in the comparison between individual and aggregate information; (I) knowing individual feedback versus total feedback and (2) knowing how an individual's contribution changed over time (by tracing his contributions period-to-period) versus knowing only how the total group contribution (minus your own) changed over time. Under this paper's procedure, participants cannot trace an individual's contribution over time in either of the conditions, making the comparison between treatments a measure of only the feedback and not of the additional information. The similarity of the results between the two studies suggests that this particular distinction was irrelevant.
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By aggregating the contributions only over the last five periods of the game (a somewhat arbitrary choice), Sell and Wilson demonstrate that participants in the individual infonnarion condition comribute more than participants in the aggregate infonnation condition. Data from practice rounds and copies of instructions are available from the author.
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Since the individual contributions were displayed in increasing order rather than in the order of participant number, participants could not identify how much (or whether) a group member's contribution had changed in consecutive rounds.
~n only one of the twenty periods of the game (period nine of the restart game), average contributions differ. Contributions in the other periods are not significantly different.
~he Wilcoxon statistic tests the hypothesis that two sets of data were generated from the same underlying distribution. For each period, independent observations (average group contributions n==6 m=6) were compared. For each game, average group contributions for all ten periods were tested using the large sample approximation version of the test (n=60 m=60). Over both games togerher (n=l20 m=J20) the Wilcoxon test with large sample approximation could not reject the hypothesis that the data were generated from the same underlying distribution at the 5% level (z=J.S7 p=.I IS7).
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Group contributions in each round are independent observations as members of one group never interacted with members of another. Some groups achieved rhe pareto optimal solution of full contribution in the individual-feedback condition in all but rhe last few rounds of each game.
11 The F-test results reported here pooled the average group contributions for each period over each game and over both games. In each game n=60 m=60 (6 groups for 10 periods). In borh games n==l20 m==l20.
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The t-test used here testS the similarity of two proportions. If Pi is rhe proportion of free riders (alternately, full contributors) in treatment i and ni is the number of observations in the treatment then
Here, ni for each individual period is 24 individual contributions. Over each game, 240 observations were used (24 contributions in each of 10 periods). Over borh games, 480 observations were used.
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Using a 2-sided Wilcoxon test on individual contributions, we cannot reject at 5% level the hypoThesis that contributions in round i of the first game are the same as contributions in round i of the restart game with one exception: total feedback first round 7 and restart round 7 are different at rhe 5% level.
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"The blocking technique looks at the differences between each participant's contribution in period i of the first game and period i of the restart game fori= I, 2, ... ! 0. Then it tests wherher rhe distribution of rhese d ifferences is significantly different from zero. In the total-feedback treatment, rhe distribution of these differences was significantly positive (z=S.ll, p<.Ol), suggesting that participants contributed Jess in the restart game than they had in the first game. In the individual-feedback treatment, however, this distribution is not distinguishable from zero at any level of significance (z=.30, p>.2).
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Weimann (1 994) is an excellent case-in-point. The author compares two experimental treatments wirh differing feedback on the basis of their means, concludes that there is no statistical difference between the treatments and proceeds to pool the data without examining rhe variances of the observations. .
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. Attached please find a set of screen print-outs which illustrate the instructions presented to the subjects for each of the treatments of this experiment. These instructions are to be used to aid in the reviewing process and are not intended for publication.
• This is station u 1
Welcome to an Economic Experiment This is an exper il•ent in the eronoooics of group decision naking. Various research agencies haue prouided the funds for conducting this research. If you follow the instructions and ll4ke good decisions you nay earn a considerable a.ount of ADney which will be paid to you in cash at the end of the experiaent. Feel free to make as much money as you can.
We will require some personal data for record keeping. All information is kept confidential. 
C.:>:_t
This is an experiment in the economics of gr oup decision maki11g. The experilllent ~ill last 2 periods . You have been randomly assigned to a particular group of 1 people (6 other people plus yourself). The ~hers of your group ~ill not change throughout the experiment.
In the beginning of each period you and every other member of the group uill be endo~ed with 25 "tokens". In each period you must decide }lQI;I to diuide your tokens betueen a PRIUATE ACCOUNT and a GROUP ACCOUNT. Each person in the group has a PRIUATE ACCOUNT and is making a siRilar .decision. Howeuer, there is only one GROUP ACCOUNT for the entire group.
In each period you will earn 2 cents for each token placed in your PRIUATE ACCOUNT. Thus, if you choose to place all of your tokens in your PRIVATE ACCOUNT you would earn <25 x 2) = 56 cents in that period.
In each period you and euery other member of the group will earn 1 cent for each token placed in the GROUP ACCOUNT. All members of the group can place tokens in the GROUP ACCOUNT.
Before making your decision you will have an opportunity to review the past decisions of your group by pressing FS.
Your cash earnings for the experiment "'i ll be the sum of your profits from the GROUP ACCOUNT and fro"' your PRIUATE ACCOUNT. There will be 2 practi ce periods before you begin the actual experir:1ent. The practice periods uill familiarize you with the computer progran. You will not be paid for the practice periods.
= = = ===== ---=91 Press PgDn to continue Ill============='~
Press the R key to see the instructions again. Press the Q key to su01100n an assistant if you haue questions. Otherwise, please be patient until the other players are ready.
Waiting for others to finish . . . £ueryone is nou ready to begin. Before starting the experiMent there will be 2 practice periods. The practice periods will help you beco01e fa01iliar ~lth the co01puter progra01. You will not be paid for the practice periods. After the practice periods, the actual experinent will begin and uill last 2 periods. The noney earned during the actual experi01ent will be yours to keep.
Good luck. For each token that you place in the PRIUATE ACCOUNT you will receive 2 cents.
For each token that each member of the group (including yourself) places in the GROUP ACCOUNT you and every other member of the group will receive 1 cent.
How rnany tokens do you want to place in the GROUP ACCOUNT? ->2
You have decided to place 2 tokens in the GROUP ACCOUNT this period. You uill place the reoaining 23 tokens in your PRIUATE ACCOUNT this period.
Press FlO to confirm, or press any other key to change your decision For each token that you place in the PRIUATE ACCOUNT you will receive 2 cents.
For each token that each ne~ber of the group (including yourself) places in the GROUP ACCOUNT you and every other ~e~ber of the group uill r eceive 1 cent.
To help with your decision, you ~ay want to look at the history of past decisions of this group. To see the history of pas t decisions press FS.
Ho~ ~any tokens do you want to place in the GROUP ACCOUNT? ->5
You have decided to place 5 tokens in the GROUP ACCOUNT this period. You will place the renaining 26 tokens in your PRIUATE ACCOUNT this period.
Press FlO to confir~. or press any other key to change your decision Nou ue uill begin the actual experi~ent . The experi~ent will las t 2 periods. The ~oney you earn fro~ now on will be yours to keep, so ~ake your decisions carefully.
"=~~======l,l Press any key to continue 1,1==~-~==...a
Period: 1 Decision Stage
You haue 25 tokens to diuide betwee n the PRIVATE and GROUP ACCOUNTS.
For each token that you place in the PRIVATE ACCOUNT you will receiue 2 cents.
For each token that each ~e~ber of the group (including yourself) places in the GROUP ACCOUNT you and euery other member of the group will receiue 1. cent.
How ~any tokens do you want to place in the GROUP ACCOUNT? ->3
You haue decided to place 3 tokens in the GROUP ACCOUNT this period. You uill place the re~aining 22 tokens in your PRIVATE ACCOUNT this period. 
